Yet another essay of mine that I’ll post here. This paper concerns the foreign diplomacy of Japan in the years and months leading up to World War 2, culminating in the events of August, 1939.
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In the Far East, with the outbreak of World War Two on the horizon, a dangerous game of diplomacy was being played, with the premium players being, in 1939: Japan, Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent at this time, the United States. The Japanese had been met with some success in their aggression against China, but were still dealing with mass resistance from the Chinese. Additionally, Japan was met with diplomatic resistance from Great Britain who opposed the encroachment on their own possessions in the Far East and feared the elimination of Western influence in Far East Asia.[1] On the other side, Germany was vying for Japanese alliance, first through the anti-Comintern pact, and then later with attempted negotiations to draw Japan into a strategic military alliance through 1938 into the summer of 1939. The Japanese Empire had very specific goals in the Far East and was not willing to back down or sacrifice their own interests just to be allied with a Western power that would undervalue them at the end of the war like in World War One. The Paris Peace Conference only two decades ago was still fresh in the minds of the Japanese who were humiliated and suffered indignities despite being an ally with Britain and France. The conference denied the Japanese the retention of Shantung after the conclusion of the war. Additionally, and likely much more harming to international relations between Japan and the West, particularly Britain, was the rejected plea for racial equality.[2] Ironically, the failure of Britain to mend these relations would lead to the eventual entry of Japan into the Axis with Germany in 1941, who themselves professed the need for genetic purity.
In August of 1939 however, Japan was not ready to commit to the Nazi camp. And perhaps their unwillingness to agree to Hitler’s terms encouraged the surprising Nazi-Soviet pact to be signed August 23rd, 1939. Japan felt betrayed by the Germans, particularly due to the Nomonhan disaster lasting from May through to end of August, 1939 resulting in a decisive victory for Soviet forces in an engagement between the Mongolians and Manchukuo.[3] The anti-Comintern pact was effectively at an end with no support coming from the Germans during this conflict. The anti-Comintern pact was established November 25th, 1936. For all intents and purposes, this document was an anti-Soviet treaty stating that if either Japan or Germany were threatened by the Soviet Union, the other agreed to not aid the Soviet Union and in turn consult with the other party to “preserve their common interests.”[4] For the Japanese, this would prevent Soviet aggression in the north, allowing them to properly allocate their resources towards completing their war against the Chinese. The Germans attempted to amend the pact to include the British and French, which Japan immediately refused.[5] Another step toward a full formal alliance was not what Japan wanted, and the fear of an Anglo-American alliance was enough to keep Japan off-balance diplomatically considering their dependence on the Western market, particularly the United States for their supply of oil.[6] The only formal alliance that interested Japan would be a military agreement against the Soviets in hopes of deterring further Soviet intervention in China and Mongolia.[7]
The problem for Japan was that the two powers vying for their favour, Germany and Britain, were far from honest in their pursuit of an alliance with Japan. Japan over-estimated the dedication of these two powers in winning them over to one camp or the other. Germany’s lack of dedication can be seen with their quick change of policy in the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact when negotiations with Japan were not leading in the direction Hitler wanted. Great Britain was very interested in obtaining Japan as an ally in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet pact; Sir R. Craigie made this a priority of British diplomacy in the Far East, stating: “we should concentrate on drawing Japan away from Germany and towards ourselves.”[8] However, in actuality, the commitment of Britain was very relaxed. It is true Britain would rather have Japan allied with them as opposed to Germany, but Britain was unwilling to give in to any of Japan’s interests in the Far East in order to assure them as an ally. In fact, the primary concern of Britain was that with the Nazi-Soviet pact in place, a potential Japanese-Soviet pact that would put the three powers together.[9] This fear was ultimately unfounded given the hostile relationship between the Soviets and the Japanese, which is why Japan felt so betrayed by the Germans at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Despite this misplaced sense of urgency, Great Britain would act very slowly on the diplomatic side, failing to negotiate with Japan due to Britain’s tendency to demand Japanese concessions to British interests in the Far East. Instead, Britain attempted to empathize with Japan’s feeling of betrayal, hoping to improve mutual relations by highlighting the “double-crossing of Japan by Germany and ourselves by Russia”.[10]
The inability of Britain to successfully negotiate any form of pact or treaty following the Nazi-Soviet pact, which opened a huge door for British diplomacy, is a critical error of the British diplomatic office. However, the difficulties they faced may have been alleviated had they been a little more willing to work with Japan back in 1919, rather than alienate them from the spoils of war that they had all fought for. In 1939, it was Japan’s turn to get what it wanted and refused to make any concessions to the powers that had humiliated them two decades before at the Paris Peace Conference. Japan had begun to acquire a modest colonial Empire at the close of World War One, but it was negligible compared to what they had earned and thought they deserved during the peace negotiations.[11] A further obstacle for British negotiation was their constant support of China and their support of Chiang’s resistance against the Japanese, forcing Japan to commit more time and money to obtaining and maintaining control over the mainland.[12] In the eyes of the Japanese, the way the West dealt with them was due to their inherent racialism against all Asian peoples. Japan felt they had narrowly avoided becoming a colony to the West and were intent on not giving away any of their autonomy for fear of becoming subservient to the West.[13]
On the side of Japan though, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact and betrayal of Germany cannot be exaggerated. Anti-German sentiment exploded at the blatant violation of the anti-Comintern pact, and additionally revealed that their trust in Germany was severely misplaced as while Germany was attempting negotiations with Japan they were underhandedly doing the same with the Soviet Union.[14] The extents of German negotiations with the USSR were quick and easy for Germany as Stalin was desperate to stall any altercation with Germany for as long as possible, so Japan’s assumption that Germany was always working behind their back may not be entirely true. However, throughout the Japanese campaign in China, the Germans were providing the Chinese nationalists with supplies while attempting to manufacture a military alliance with the Japanese.[15] Realistically speaking, both the Germans and the British, at this time, would need to offer a lot to improve relations considering the very poor opinion the Japanese had of the West. Of course, neither side was willing to make concessions or, in truth, treat the Japanese as an equal power on the worldwide scene. Dating back to 1933, Japan was intent on establishing an East Asian Empire, or what General Ishiwara Kanji had called, an East Asian League.[16] Ultimately, a League of this nation would be contrary to British, Russian and American interests in China itself and also see the Japanese gain a mass amount of centralized power, making them a threat to external colonies and interests beyond the immediate sphere of influence.
Repeatedly, Japan moved to gain support for their interests and Imperial aims in the Far East with very little real support coming. Germany gave it briefly, but the anti-Comintern pact was worth very little to the Germans as it was intended as only a stepping stone towards a tripartite alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy. The Soviet problem began to increase in March 1936 when the Soviet Union signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with Mongolia; this pact would result in the Soviet incursion at Nomonhan and the eventual disaster for the Japanese.[17] After Nomonhan and the Nazi-Soviet pact, Japanese policy was in tatters. Due to an excessive failure, both military at Nomonhan, and diplomatically with the Germans, Hiranuma Kiichiro and his ministry resigned from parliament on August 30, 1939.[18] Replacing him was Premier Abe and Admiral Nomura, a duo that was predominantly pro-Western and anti-German. Japanese diplomacy had undergone its third change of office in less than ten months, making it difficult for Japanese policy to effectively dictate any concrete and productive direction in international negotiations.
In August of 1939, Japan had just suffered a severe military defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union, been betrayed and humiliated by Germany’s change of policy and signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, and was internally unstable and unable to function internationally. These problems compounded themselves given the poor relations between the West and Japan, and any reconciliation was made impossible by both the West and Japan being unwilling to compromise or sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of strong relations between one another. Britain was clinging to their colonial Empire and their interests, fending off a new and growing Japanese power. Pulling on Japan from the other side was Germany, attempting to drag Japan into a strong military alliance against the Western democratic powers once war hit Europe. Japan had little interest in a global European war, intent on focusing their resources in the Far East and pursuing their own Imperial interests. By the time war broke out in September of 1939, Japan would be allied with neither and no alliance was in their near future. German-Japanese relations had disintegrated at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, while Britain was electing to simply “wait and see” rather than openly pursue an alliance with the Japanese. The diplomatic uncertainty is evident in the consistent changes in the Foreign Office of Japan between January and August, 1939. Perhaps, if Japan were a Western, and white, power, they may have been able to manufacture more advantageous agreements with the nations of Europe. However, the racism of the Paris Peace Conference and the intention of preventing Japan from becoming yet another Great Power, made the task all-but insurmountable for the Japanese Foreign Office in establishing any functional and profitable relationships during the pre-war months, culminating in the complete breakdown of foreign policy in August, 1939.
Works Cited
Coox, Alvin. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939I. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1985.
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3rd Series, Volume IX. Ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955.
Meskill, Johanna Menzel. Hilter & Japan: The Hollow Alliance. New York: Atherton Press: 1966.
Nish, Ian. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869 – 1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1977.
Overy, Richard, with Andrew Wheatcroft. The Road to War. London: MacMillan: 1989.
Peattie, Mark R. “Chapter 5: The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895 – 1945,” The Cambridge History of Japan 6: The Twentieth Century (1988): 217 – 270.
[1] 6. Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Shanghai) No. 308 [F 3024/2882/10], Foreign Office, April 13, 1939,
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3
rd Series, Volume IX, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955): 5.
[2] Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1985): 17.
[3] Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869 – 1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1977): 232.
[4] Ibid., 229.
[5] Ibid., 230.
[6] Johanna Menzel Meskill, Hilter & Japan: The Hollow Alliance (New York: Atherton Press: 1966): 7.
[7] Ibid., 8.
[8] 584. Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) to Viscount Halifax No. 1095 Telegraphic [F 9421/87/10], Tokyo, August, 25, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3rd Series, Volume IX, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955): 495 – 496.
[9] 589. Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) to Viscount Halifax No. 1103 Telegraphic [F 9469/87/10], Tokyo, August 26, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939: 500.
[10] 598. Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) No. 710 [F 9601/176/23] Foreign Office, August 28, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939: 507 – 508.
[11] Mark R. Peattie, “Chapter 5: The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895 – 1945,” The Cambridge History of Japan 6: The Twentieth Century (1988): 269.
[12] Nish, 230.
[13] Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War (London: MacMillan: 1989): 228 – 229.
[14] Nish, 231.
[15] Overy, 245.
[16] Nish, 211.
[17] Overy, 247.
[18] Nish, 231.
