Mac vs. PC Debate… I’m tired

Posted in Rants with tags , , , , , on November 9, 2009 by acannell

Okay, let me expose any and all bias. I use a PC, I actually like Windows Vista, I’m really interested to eventually try Windows 7, and in my experience Macs are over-rated simply because it’s the “thing to do”. This is going to be somewhat of a rambling about things in the constant Mac vs. PC debate that annoys me and maybe try and get a point across, I haven’t decided yet.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – -

The first thing I’ll touch on is the Mac vs. PC commercials that we all know and love (or hate). I find them annoying simply because it attempts to convey the PC experience and faults of the PC, most of which I have not encountered. But what has started to really annoy me is that it’s “PC vs. Mac” but really, all they take about is Windows. From what I recall, there are other operating systems used on PCs, but that’s a very small and insignificant argument, it’s just a little area of these commercials that annoy me. Second, one of the big “defenses” used by Mac fanboys is that option where you can install Windows on Macs and then say “See, Macs are better. We can use Windows.” Last time I checked, you were obsessed with putting Windows down as an inferior OS and now you’re claiming that being able to run Windows on a Mac makes you better than a PC? Whatever…

Moving on: aside from the commercials, there are conventional arguments. They’re better for media, they don’t get viruses, PCs are riddled with Malware and Spyware, and the dreaded “blue screen of death”. First the media “myth”, yes, I’ll call it a myth. Everything you can do with a Mac you can do with a PC. Audio and media recording? My band recorded and mastered a full album with extensive VSTs, guitar/vocal/drum tracks, you name it. It was a demanding album from a technical perspective. All of it done with a PC. I’ve seen people do artwork using Tablets and Photoshop to create amazing pieces of visuals with a PC. I don’t doubt Macs are good and capable, but claiming that PCs can’t? Proof please… or maybe ask a PC user first?

Now, I haven’t had virus problems with my computer on Vista, yes I do have virus protection, but the virus threat is not PCs fault, viruses are made, not a by-product of PCs existence (oh, and Macs do get viruses btw… look it up). PCs do get targeted for Malware/Spyware (there is also very adequate and FREE protection for that as well – I can offer some suggestions) – and no… virus/spyware/malware protection does not slow your computer. I don’t doubt it uses some resources, but computers are loaded with so much hardware that it’s negligible.

Finally, the beloved “blue screen of death”: I have never encountered this screen since Windows 98. The computer was old, my younger brother had beaten that computer into the ground like a teenager with his recently acquired license beats the old ‘91 Tempo into the ground. Since then, XP? Vista? (I never ran Windows 2000 or ME) I have never had a blue screen of death, this age-old problem with PCs seems to have disappeared. And no, I don’t have any other type of screen, no green screens, black screens, red screens.

I’m not negating that PCs have problems, all pieces of technology have problems, they have defective parts, users don’t know how to completely take care of them (I am hardly perfect at keeping my PC running at peak efficiency), but all of these problems are found in Macs as well. The first mac I used (outside those age old Apple’s in my Grade 2 classroom) was my ex girlfriend’s in 2001. The computer was slow, would just hang up for no reason, the browser would freeze, stop responding and you would have to do some weird key command (similar to ctrl+alt+del I assume) to close the browser and try and start over. It had consistent problems with losing saved data or just simply turning off for no goddamn reason.

Again, PC’s aren’t perfect, but neither are Macs. I’m tired of this debate… you like Macs? Great, enjoy – but don’t throw these ridiculous arguments trying to downplay PCs especially when many of the arguments aren’t indicative of most PC users. If I wanted to ask only the minority of disgruntled users, I could make it sound like Macs were completely useless too.

In parting, I leave you this somewhat old video. I really enjoy it though.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iEAGmBRC1dc

The Question of Japan, 1939

Posted in history with tags , , , , , on November 5, 2009 by acannell

Yet another essay of mine that I’ll post here. This paper concerns the foreign diplomacy of Japan in the years and months leading up to World War 2, culminating in the events of August, 1939.

- – - – - – - – - -

In the Far East, with the outbreak of World War Two on the horizon, a dangerous game of diplomacy was being played, with the premium players being, in 1939: Japan, Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent at this time, the United States. The Japanese had been met with some success in their aggression against China, but were still dealing with mass resistance from the Chinese. Additionally, Japan was met with diplomatic resistance from Great Britain who opposed the encroachment on their own possessions in the Far East and feared the elimination of Western influence in Far East Asia.[1] On the other side, Germany was vying for Japanese alliance, first through the anti-Comintern pact, and then later with attempted negotiations to draw Japan into a strategic military alliance through 1938 into the summer of 1939. The Japanese Empire had very specific goals in the Far East and was not willing to back down or sacrifice their own interests just to be allied with a Western power that would undervalue them at the end of the war like in World War One. The Paris Peace Conference only two decades ago was still fresh in the minds of the Japanese who were humiliated and suffered indignities despite being an ally with Britain and France. The conference denied the Japanese the retention of Shantung after the conclusion of the war. Additionally, and likely much more harming to international relations between Japan and the West, particularly Britain, was the rejected plea for racial equality.[2] Ironically, the failure of Britain to mend these relations would lead to the eventual entry of Japan into the Axis with Germany in 1941, who themselves professed the need for genetic purity.

In August of 1939 however, Japan was not ready to commit to the Nazi camp. And perhaps their unwillingness to agree to Hitler’s terms encouraged the surprising Nazi-Soviet pact to be signed August 23rd, 1939. Japan felt betrayed by the Germans, particularly due to the Nomonhan disaster lasting from May through to end of August, 1939 resulting in a decisive victory for Soviet forces in an engagement between the Mongolians and Manchukuo.[3] The anti-Comintern pact was effectively at an end with no support coming from the Germans during this conflict. The anti-Comintern pact was established November 25th, 1936. For all intents and purposes, this document was an anti-Soviet treaty stating that if either Japan or Germany were threatened by the Soviet Union, the other agreed to not aid the Soviet Union and in turn consult with the other party to “preserve their common interests.”[4] For the Japanese, this would prevent Soviet aggression in the north, allowing them to properly allocate their resources towards completing their war against the Chinese. The Germans attempted to amend the pact to include the British and French, which Japan immediately refused.[5] Another step toward a full formal alliance was not what Japan wanted, and the fear of an Anglo-American alliance was enough to keep Japan off-balance diplomatically considering their dependence on the Western market, particularly the United States for their supply of oil.[6] The only formal alliance that interested Japan would be a military agreement against the Soviets in hopes of deterring further Soviet intervention in China and Mongolia.[7]

The problem for Japan was that the two powers vying for their favour, Germany and Britain, were far from honest in their pursuit of an alliance with Japan. Japan over-estimated the dedication of these two powers in winning them over to one camp or the other. Germany’s lack of dedication can be seen with their quick change of policy in the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact when negotiations with Japan were not leading in the direction Hitler wanted. Great Britain was very interested in obtaining Japan as an ally in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet pact; Sir R. Craigie made this a priority of British diplomacy in the Far East, stating: “we should concentrate on drawing Japan away from Germany and towards ourselves.”[8] However, in actuality, the commitment of Britain was very relaxed. It is true Britain would rather have Japan allied with them as opposed to Germany, but Britain was unwilling to give in to any of Japan’s interests in the Far East in order to assure them as an ally. In fact, the primary concern of Britain was that with the Nazi-Soviet pact in place, a potential Japanese-Soviet pact that would put the three powers together.[9] This fear was ultimately unfounded given the hostile relationship between the Soviets and the Japanese, which is why Japan felt so betrayed by the Germans at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Despite this misplaced sense of urgency, Great Britain would act very slowly on the diplomatic side, failing to negotiate with Japan due to Britain’s tendency to demand Japanese concessions to British interests in the Far East. Instead, Britain attempted to empathize with Japan’s feeling of betrayal, hoping to improve mutual relations by highlighting the “double-crossing of Japan by Germany and ourselves by Russia”.[10]

The inability of Britain to successfully negotiate any form of pact or treaty following the Nazi-Soviet pact, which opened a huge door for British diplomacy, is a critical error of the British diplomatic office. However, the difficulties they faced may have been alleviated had they been a little more willing to work with Japan back in 1919, rather than alienate them from the spoils of war that they had all fought for. In 1939, it was Japan’s turn to get what it wanted and refused to make any concessions to the powers that had humiliated them two decades before at the Paris Peace Conference. Japan had begun to acquire a modest colonial Empire at the close of World War One, but it was negligible compared to what they had earned and thought they deserved during the peace negotiations.[11] A further obstacle for British negotiation was their constant support of China and their support of Chiang’s resistance against the Japanese, forcing Japan to commit more time and money to obtaining and maintaining control over the mainland.[12] In the eyes of the Japanese, the way the West dealt with them was due to their inherent racialism against all Asian peoples. Japan felt they had narrowly avoided becoming a colony to the West and were intent on not giving away any of their autonomy for fear of becoming subservient to the West.[13]

On the side of Japan though, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact and betrayal of Germany cannot be exaggerated. Anti-German sentiment exploded at the blatant violation of the anti-Comintern pact, and additionally revealed that their trust in Germany was severely misplaced as while Germany was attempting negotiations with Japan they were underhandedly doing the same with the Soviet Union.[14] The extents of German negotiations with the USSR were quick and easy for Germany as Stalin was desperate to stall any altercation with Germany for as long as possible, so Japan’s assumption that Germany was always working behind their back may not be entirely true. However, throughout the Japanese campaign in China, the Germans were providing the Chinese nationalists with supplies while attempting to manufacture a military alliance with the Japanese.[15] Realistically speaking, both the Germans and the British, at this time, would need to offer a lot to improve relations considering the very poor opinion the Japanese had of the West. Of course, neither side was willing to make concessions or, in truth, treat the Japanese as an equal power on the worldwide scene. Dating back to 1933, Japan was intent on establishing an East Asian Empire, or what General Ishiwara Kanji had called, an East Asian League.[16] Ultimately, a League of this nation would be contrary to British, Russian and American interests in China itself and also see the Japanese gain a mass amount of centralized power, making them a threat to external colonies and interests beyond the immediate sphere of influence.

Repeatedly, Japan moved to gain support for their interests and Imperial aims in the Far East with very little real support coming. Germany gave it briefly, but the anti-Comintern pact was worth very little to the Germans as it was intended as only a stepping stone towards a tripartite alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy. The Soviet problem began to increase in March 1936 when the Soviet Union signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with Mongolia; this pact would result in the Soviet incursion at Nomonhan and the eventual disaster for the Japanese.[17] After Nomonhan and the Nazi-Soviet pact, Japanese policy was in tatters. Due to an excessive failure, both military at Nomonhan, and diplomatically with the Germans, Hiranuma Kiichiro and his ministry resigned from parliament on August 30, 1939.[18] Replacing him was Premier Abe and Admiral Nomura, a duo that was predominantly pro-Western and anti-German. Japanese diplomacy had undergone its third change of office in less than ten months, making it difficult for Japanese policy to effectively dictate any concrete and productive direction in international negotiations.

In August of 1939, Japan had just suffered a severe military defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union, been betrayed and humiliated by Germany’s change of policy and signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, and was internally unstable and unable to function internationally. These problems compounded themselves given the poor relations between the West and Japan, and any reconciliation was made impossible by both the West and Japan being unwilling to compromise or sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of strong relations between one another. Britain was clinging to their colonial Empire and their interests, fending off a new and growing Japanese power. Pulling on Japan from the other side was Germany, attempting to drag Japan into a strong military alliance against the Western democratic powers once war hit Europe. Japan had little interest in a global European war, intent on focusing their resources in the Far East and pursuing their own Imperial interests. By the time war broke out in September of 1939, Japan would be allied with neither and no alliance was in their near future. German-Japanese relations had disintegrated at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, while Britain was electing to simply “wait and see” rather than openly pursue an alliance with the Japanese. The diplomatic uncertainty is evident in the consistent changes in the Foreign Office of Japan between January and August, 1939. Perhaps, if Japan were a Western, and white, power, they may have been able to manufacture more advantageous agreements with the nations of Europe. However, the racism of the Paris Peace Conference and the intention of preventing Japan from becoming yet another Great Power, made the task all-but insurmountable for the Japanese Foreign Office in establishing any functional and profitable relationships during the pre-war months, culminating in the complete breakdown of foreign policy in August, 1939.

 

 

Works Cited

 

Coox, Alvin. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939I. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1985.

 

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3rd Series, Volume IX. Ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan   Butler. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955.

 

Meskill, Johanna Menzel. Hilter & Japan: The Hollow Alliance. New York: Atherton Press: 1966.

 

Nish, Ian. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869 – 1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka. London: Routledge &        Kegan Paul: 1977.

 

Overy, Richard,  with Andrew Wheatcroft. The Road to War. London: MacMillan: 1989.

 

Peattie, Mark R. “Chapter 5: The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895 – 1945,” The Cambridge History of         Japan 6: The Twentieth Century (1988): 217 – 270.

 


[1] 6. Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Shanghai) No. 308 [F 3024/2882/10], Foreign Office, April 13, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3rd Series, Volume IX, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955): 5.

[2] Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1985): 17.

[3] Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869 – 1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1977): 232.

[4] Ibid., 229.

[5] Ibid., 230.

[6] Johanna Menzel Meskill, Hilter & Japan: The Hollow Alliance (New York: Atherton Press: 1966): 7.

[7] Ibid., 8.

[8] 584. Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) to Viscount Halifax No. 1095 Telegraphic [F 9421/87/10], Tokyo, August, 25, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939, 3rd Series, Volume IX, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955): 495 – 496.

[9] 589. Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) to Viscount Halifax No. 1103 Telegraphic [F 9469/87/10], Tokyo, August 26, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939: 500.

[10] 598. Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo) No. 710 [F 9601/176/23] Foreign Office, August 28, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1939: 507 – 508.

[11] Mark R. Peattie, “Chapter 5: The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895 – 1945,” The Cambridge History of Japan 6: The Twentieth Century (1988): 269.

[12] Nish, 230.

[13] Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War (London: MacMillan: 1989): 228 – 229.

[14] Nish, 231.

[15] Overy, 245.

[16] Nish, 211.

[17] Overy, 247.

[18] Nish, 231.

Thumbs down to roommates…

Posted in Rants with tags , , on November 1, 2009 by acannell

I think I’m destined to live on my own, or well… with a significant other, I’m pretty sure I could manage that. I’m inclined to agree with How I Met Your Mother, I can’t live with a girl if there’s no sex, sex solves the disputes, lol. This isn’t really giving you any indication about my problem is it? Sorry

Okay, so Sundays are pretty much the ONLY day I care about TV. Any TV shows I stream online, hockey games are hit or miss for me, my other roommates are usually watching it so I don’t need to “reserve” the TV for that. Anyway, Sundays are NFL Football days as almost everyone knows, I watch football every week, it’s my thing. The one thing I look forward to on Sundays. Anyway, I wake up this morning and the roommate is watching CSI, that’s fine – it’s still early, I’m only missing the beginning of the early games, no big deal. Right?

Well, it’s 6:21pm, almost through the late afternoon games and I have not watched any football. My roommate is still watching CSI, good show, but it’s all fucking re-runs! Stream it online if you want, CSI plays all day every day somewhere, we have a pretty extensive cable package. NFL Football airs on SUNDAYS, the one day of the week. I’m the only one who’s paid for the cable, they all owe me money still and I haven’t been able to watch any football. Now, I’m not being annoyingly passive, I’ve said – “Can I watch football?”. Reply: “ugh, no. it’s so boring…”

Yea, well you don’t have to watch it… you reserve the TV every Monday for House, I’d like to watch How I Met Your Mother, but you know what? It’s okay, I can stream HIMYM online so no big deal… cable is the only way I can watch football. This is fucking bullshit… so pissed… off. I would give anything to live on my own.

Richard Evans, David Irving and the Holocaust

Posted in history with tags , , , , , on October 28, 2009 by acannell

Here’s another hefty article/paper I wrote. Enjoy.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – -

Richard Evans: Defining historical scholarship
- De-constructing the works of David Irving

Richard Evans’ 2001 publication, Lying about Hitler, is the first truly academic study into the works of David Irving in regards to Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Prior to his critical examination and, essentially, his de-construction of the lies and fabrications employed by Irving, there was very limited, and in some cases, mixed reviews of Irving’s work. A number of academics gave praise to Irving for his “ingenuity and persistence” in regards to his research.[1] However, as Evans points out, few historians had actually taken the time embark on any detailed analysis of Irving’s work.[2] One of the few examples I came across was the 1979 review of Hitler’s War, by Charles W. Sydnor, Jr. wherein he describes a “less conspicuous mistake” involving Irving’s interpretation of the SS and their function,[3] potentially suggesting some intention to Irving’s fabrications, however, it is done so in a far less determined manner than Evans. Evans appears to be the first to critically analyze the work of David Irving, breaking down the self-proclaimed historian’s methods of research, cross-checking his footnotes in order to prove, or more often than not, disprove their authenticity, ultimately resulting in the complete destruction of David Irving as a reputable historian rather than a propagandist, advocating holocaust denial. Evans, in the role of a historian, goes to the archives, studying and researching (or perhaps re-researching). Re-tracing the steps of Irving, piecing together his tapestry of lies and falsifications in conjunction with his association with right-wing neo-Nazi organizations, as well as his own speeches that harboured blatant feelings of anti-Semitism and holocaust denial, Evans is able to successfully defend fellow historian Deborah Libstadt in court, but perhaps more importantly, in this book, he is able to lay down the principles of proper and improper historical methodology as practiced within the modern discipline of history.

To commence his investigation of David Irving’s historical works, Richard Evans interpreted Irving’s relationship to the realm of history as a profession. Irving, unlike most historians, did not possess any institutional training and thus did not complete the traditional rites of passage. This disparity between Irving and modern historians prompted Evans to compare Irving’s enthusiasm with research and the discovery of sources more closely to a “journalist pulling off a scoop” than with a professional modern historian.[4] Furthermore, it became clear to Evans that Irving did not consult or refer to the studies of other historians, which Evans found disturbing.[5] Irving posed a considerable risk to modern history as Evans understood and respected it. History as a profession was a communal enterprise with previous works of historians being built upon, debated, elaborated or simply re-written based upon new evidence, source or simply by the emergence of a new interpretation. Irving’s refusal to conform and integrate himself into this community separated him from historians; he was not a historian by Evans’ definition, but rather an author of past events, and once his study was completed, Irving would be officially given another title.

Ultimately, Evans assumes his role of historian when investigating and dismantling the work of David Irving. His skills of research, interpretation and analysis were transferred from his regular field of historical study into a study of the history of David Irving as a history. This type of strategy is evident in how Evans structures his argument. He examines and contrasts the two editions of Hitler’s War, 1977 and then a second edition released in 1991. Though a number of controversies and new evidence had been produced between these two publications, Evans found that Irving ignored new evidence that refuted some of his claims in the 1977 edition, but subsequently utilized any documentary evidence revealed since 1977 that could be manipulated into aiding his argument. This selective tendency towards the sources and blatant manipulation was Evans’ prime argument against Irving.[6] To summarize Evans’ opinion of Irving’s use of historical record and documentary evidence, Evans states, about Irving:

He relied on material that turned out directly to contradict his arguments when it was checked. He quoted from sources in a manner that distorted their author’s meaning and purposes. He misrepresented data and skewed documents. He used insignificant and sometimes implausible pieces of evidence to dismiss more substantial evidence that did not support his thesis. He ignored or deliberately suppressed material when it ran counter to his arguments. When he was unable to do this, he expressed implausible doubts about its reliability.[7]

Evans quotes Irving’s argument that all historians must be selective in presenting documentary evidence, labelling Jewish historians as being selective in order to further their own political agenda and then going on to deny that he possessed any political agenda of his own when writing.[8] Clearly Irving’s selection of documents was dependent on how they fell into what can be called his “criteria of manipulation or falsification”. And in all instances, there is little doubt that his method of selection entirely paralleled his obvious agenda of holocaust denial and anti-Semitic sentiment. Arguments such as this from Irving were likely infuriating to Evans, an established scholar in the profession of history. He would concede that facts are selected and that “every historical account is in some sense moulded by the aesthetic and political preferences of the writer.”[9] However, when directly confronted with this argument from Irving, Evans is quick and brutal in his dismantling of Irving’s claim as being a historian:

“if you are simply a sloppy or bad historian, the mistakes you make will be all over the place[...] if all the mistakes are in the same direction in the support of a particular thesis, then I do not think that is mere negligence. I think that is a deliberate manipulation and deception.”[10]

 

Evans’ complete opinion of Irving can be summarized with a quote from Richard Rampton: “The truth is, however, that he is not an historian at all but a falsifier of history. To put it bluntly, he is a liar.”[11] The historical enterprise is a community established between scholars of a certain calibre, properly trained and integrated into the profession through the utilization of respectable research techniques and historical authorship. Throughout Evans’ utter destruction of Irving’s methods and self-proclaimed reputation as a respected and competent historian, Evans separates Irving from the other scholars, not through direct comparison between Irving and individual historians, but rather by presenting Irving next to the expectations and academic quality of truly respected historians within the historical community.

David Irving’s tendency to distort all statements, facts, documents or other forms of evidence to suit his needs was a uniform characteristic in his operations far outside his body of historical work. Even when confronted with dialogue between individuals or in the court room, there is evidence of Irving’s inability to utilize what was actually available. Instead, he perpetually modifies and distorts statements, facts and even written reports, such as Richard Evans’ throughout the trial outlined in Lying about Hitler.[12] All of these traits of Irving separate him from modern historians. An historian has a duty to not falsify documentation. An historian is not attempting to get away with anything or sway his audience to “his side” of an issue, but rather to present documentary evidence and then put forth an analysis of it. If the evidence does not coincide with the original thesis or perception of the historian, he will modify his argument, not modify the documents or intentionally misinterpret, or mistranslate the findings. Particularly when later documents emerged that directly contradicted past arguments offered by Irving, he refused to reassess his initial position. These are not traits of an historian, as there is no shame in needing to re-write your position or reassess your previous statements in light of new evidence brought into the historical field. Ultimately, the pursuit of a proper and educated interpretation and presentation of the past should be an essential requirement of any respectable historian. Indeed some seek to present a lesson to his or her readers, but this should not compromise the integrity of the profession, nor should this be achieved through a malpractice of the basic principles of research and analysis that all historians are supposed to be educated in and thereby experts of the given field. Evans damning analysis of Irving’s work re-enforced the importance of the high standard of scholarship within the field of historical study.

All historians are not created equal, and all published works on the past are not all of the same quality. Their points and arguments are not necessarily as valid as one another and readers must be very careful and wary of the quality of scholarship taken in the construction of the effort. Unfortunately, most readers would not be in the position, nor have the time to critically analyze the work of David Irving as Richard Evans did. The casual reader of history will not likely check the footnotes, fearing that they would become lost in the block of text involving numbers, citations and references, and for the few who do read the lengthy notes, it is unlikely they would possess the means or ability to properly investigate the authenticity of these notations, citations and quotes from the massive quantity of sources that Irving has reproduced. It is in this sense that David Irving became such a danger to the community of historical scholarship. He needed to be criticized and exposed to the public so that all readers, not only the academic community of historical scholars, could realize the difference between “real history and politically motivated propaganda.”[13]

Aside from Richard Evans’ considerable work in exposing David Irving and rigidly defining the nature of proper academic scholarship within the field of history, Evans, both through his book and his testimony in the David Irving trial, considerably affected the future of the study of the Holocaust. He initiated questions to be asked of this realm of history and furthermore, he inspired very important questions to be raised. Some critics wrote that they were concerned for the future of Holocaust scholarship, possibly restricting debate between historians over the issues; either due to the subject being “untouchable” now, or simply because future scholars may fear criticism in the same vein as Irving.[14] However, Evans quickly dismisses this view along with many other critics. Genuine historians with proper research methods would not befall the same fate as Irving.[15] The de-construction of Irving’s work was not a battle against holocaust denial; it was a battle against falsifying history and manipulating documents to suit a political agenda. On the contrary to many commentators, particularly journalists who did not fully understand the difference between “free speech” and the employment of proper historical methodology, some commentators, Thomas Kielinger for one, considered that in drawing the distinction between “genuine historical research and propaganda, the case underlined the right of serious historians of the Nazi period to ask difficult questions.”[16] Indeed, the research of Richard Evans and court-ruling against David Irving defeated the realm of historical propaganda in the face of true historical scholarship. Marking the territory outside of just the academics who devote their lives to it and into the public sphere where fabricators such as Irving would not receive the respect and support that only true historians would be worthy of.

By utilizing his extensive experience and training in the field of history, Richard Evans was able to successfully dissect the work of David Irving, using historical methods of research and evaluation to evaluate his work and ultimately prove in court, to the academic community as well as to the general public that David Irving was not an historian and should not be considered amongst the ranks of scholars who tirelessly devote themselves to pursuit of history; free from the fabrication, falsification and manipulation of documentary evidence in order to pursue ulterior motives. As Richard Evans presents to use through simile, historians are like:

“figurative painters sitting at various places around a mountain. They will paint it in different styles, using different techniques and different materials[...] They may even disagree about some aspects of its appearance, or some of its features. But they will all be painting the same mountain.”[17]

 

Some facts or historical truths are not debatable; one being the existence, in some form, of genocide against the Jews during World War II as enacted by Nazi Germany, which is historically titled the Holocaust. True historians will not deny this event, but rather seek to understand it and interpret it by the analysis of the documentary evidence. These debates will continue between respectable historians who are all painting the mountain from different angles. Richard Evans separated the true historians from the propagandists, outlining the crucial components and methods of historical scholarship. With men like David Irving no longer able to hold any sway in the historical community, historians can once again resume analyzing and researching the Holocaust and Nazi Germany in hopes of achieving a greater understanding of this period in human history.

 

 

Works Cited

 

Evans, Richard. “Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial.” New York:

Basic Books, 2002.

 

Sydnor Jr., Charles W. Review of Hitler’s War, by David Irving, Central European History 12,

no. 2 (1979): 169 – 199.

 

Tosh, John. “The Pursuit of History: Aims, methods and new directions in the study of modern

History” Fourth ed. Harlow: Pearson Books: 2006.

 


[1] Richard Evans, Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (New York: Basic Books, 2002): 10.

[2] Ibid., 33

[3] Charles W. Sydnor, Jr, review of Hitler’s War, by David Irving, Central European History 12, no. 2 (1979): 177 – 178.

[4] Evans, 18.

[5] Ibid., 18 – 19.

[6] Evans, 69.

[7] Ibid., 70.

[8] Ibid., 21.

[9] John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, methods and new directions in the study of modern History Fourth ed. (Harlow: Pearson Books: 2006): 206.

[10] Evans, 205.

[11] Evans, 205.

[12] Ibid., 203.

[13] Evans, 266.

[14] Evans, 252 – 253.

[15] Ibid., 253.

[16] Ibid., 256.

[17] Evans, 250.

Bloodied, left and right

Posted in Rambling... with tags , on October 21, 2009 by acannell

Wish this title could allude to some clever political article, but unfortunately it’s about me getting way too drunk. I will officially be 21 in under an hour, but my friends hosted a party for me on Saturday which involved the mass consumption of alcohol.

The night gets a little hazy around the 11pm mark where I remember catching a ride from my friend to a nearby club where we go in, blackout after that, I remember vague details: ie. dancing with who I will hopefully assume was a hot girl. This was the lone detail I retained, then there are various verbal details involving landmarks like 7/11. However, nothing visual.

My next visual memory is walking into my house and receiving a look of surprise and horror from my friends who see me covered in blood, including gashes in my head and a left thumb which looks to have been mauled by an animal (I am still lacking movement, apparently it has been heavily hyper-extended, in addition to the mauling). My head is making a decent recovery, but people I haven’t seen since before Saturday greet me the same way: “What the fuck happened to your head?” and my answer to them is invariably the same. “I honestly don’t remember…”

Cheers to birthdays… cheers to soriety, I’m a fucking idiot.

Herodotus and warnings of Empire (Essay)

Posted in history with tags , , , , , , on October 9, 2009 by acannell

Alright, well it may be 3am, but as promised – here is the completed essay, not too long, just barely over 1000 words. Like I said, it was a short assignment. Enjoy and please comment on it, comments, criticism, discussion? Anything would be welcomed.

♦                    ♦                    ♦

In the opening of Herodotus’ Histories, he states the motivation of his writings which is as follows: “so that the events of human history may not fade with time and the notable achievements both of Greeks and of foreigners may not lack their due fame; and, among other things, to show why these peoples came to make war on one another.”[1] However, to completely understand why Herodotus decided to record his research on the Greeks and Persians through the first two decades of the 5th century BC, Herodotus must be examined much more carefully than simply accepting his opening statement. His opinions of other cultures and individual bias need to be accounted for as well as his sources for these historical accounts. Additionally, Herodotus as an individual and the Greek culture should be examined as well. As the “father of history”, Herodotus certainly possessed some elements of historical writing that are still seen today. Historians often employ a lesson to be learned or taken from their writings from their readers, and Herodotus is no exception. As this editions editor, James Romm, points out during his introduction, Herodotus was suggesting a danger to over-expansion, and grand empires as both a negative entity, and a risk to those who embark upon attempting to construct them.[2] Herodotus intended much more than to simply immortalize the events and actions of the Greeks and Persians, but to also present a lesson to later generations of Greeks, who, with the Persians rather weakened by the time of the Histories completion, were the dominant power in the known world.

Herodotus begins his Histories with an account of the Lydians and the reign of the Croesus including his subjugation of the Greeks. However, a growing power in the East roused Croesus: the Persians. The first lesson Herodotus offers to his readers comes through a speech by Solon, given to Croesus when asked who can be considered the happiest man. “No human being can possess all blessings, just as no single country can produce all that it needs.”[3] This speech is obviously fabricated as he lacked the means to possess an accurate account of this speech, or truly, any of the speeches that Herodotus offers. However, it does offer a commentary on the importance of maintaining mutually beneficial relations with neighbouring entities, rather than attempting to conquer them. Additionally, in the grand scheme of history, this exchange between Solon and Croesus is hardly substantial. It is far more likely that Herodotus included this dialogue to pass on a lesson to his readers through the guise of these two historical figures. The folly of warmongering and Empirical expansion is then expressed by the Oracle at Delphi’s warning, “if Croesus marched against the Persians, a great Empire would fall.”[4]

This theme would be re-visited at the dawn of every serious conflict and expansive movement by any of the premium powers during this period. This included the initial movements of the Persian Empire as they conquered most of Asia and North Africa. Prior to embarking on conquests, Herodotus would present a discussion between the primary characters involved at the time. This was done through a dialogue of two or more characters discussing the reasons for and against military engagement against another group of peoples. With Xerxes ready to invade Greece, Mardonius advised Xerxes to not hastily attack the Greeks due to their strength, but also to avoid incurring the wrath of God, “Do you see how the god hurls his lightning at the outsized beasts and stops their proud displays, while the smaller creatures bother him not at all?”[5] Again, Herodotus implies the dangers of overexpansion, implying the goals of large Empires threaten the Gods, and thus incur their wrath.

Herodotus does have a second lesson to give his audience however, though it is less subtle and far less frequently expressed throughout his narrative. Prior to the invasion of Greece, Darius’ wife Atossa spoke to her husband about the need to pursue glory. Darius had recently suffered an injury and had grown stagnant in his position as a ruler. However, Atossa’s words convinced Darius to begin preparations to invade the Scythians, a nomadic people of Europe.[6] This action would prove disastrous for the Persians, nearly resulting in Darius’ death. Again Herodotus touches on the dangers of over-expansive Empires, but he also seems to imply the dangers of allowing women to sway the minds of men, leading to such disasters as the one Darius nearly incurred while trying to subjugate the Scythians. Herodotus does not reinforce this opinion throughout the text as adamantly as he does his cautions about over-expansion. Yet, acknowledging this other angle to Herodotus is indeed important in understanding him as a writer, as well as considering the variety of lessons that Herodotus presents to his audience of Greeks.

These lessons put forward by Herodotus were definitely intended to be modeled by the Greeks, and to a certain extent may have been used and considered by leading officials in Greece after the fall in power of the Persian Empire. Greece was a relatively unrivalled power after Persia’s fall, yet they did not seek Empirical aims to the same extent as the Persians. Whether this was an inherent quality of the Greek culture, or simply the Greek people never had the means to pursue Empirical aims given the political divisions between the various city-states, it could be considered that Herodotus engrained some deterrent of mass expansion. Greece, particularly Athens, possessed the desire to improve and grow within their own borders, exporting culture, philosophy and technology, resulting in some of the greatest achievements of the classical era. These accomplishments may not have been possible if Greece had developed into a society overly reliant upon military conquest. The Histories did, as Herodotus intended, preserve and immortalize the events and achievements of people throughout the Greco-Persian war and the years leading up to its outbreak. Additionally, Herodotus left guidance and some lessons that he hoped his Greek readers would adopt and appreciate, immortalizing himself within the annals of history as well.


Works Cited

Herodotus. On the War for Greek Freedom. Translated by Samuel Shirley. Edited, with introduction

and notes by James Romm. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003.


[1] Herodotus. On the War for Greek Freedom. Translated by Samuel Shirley. Edited, with introduction and notes by James Romm. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003: 1.

[2] Ibid., xvii.

[3] Ibid., 11.

[4] Ibid., 16.

[5]Ibid., 124.

[6] Ibid., 76 – 77.

Prelude: upcoming post on Herodotus

Posted in history on October 8, 2009 by acannell

I am in the process of writing a short essay on Herodotus’ work the Histories. However, I’m feeling incredibly keen on procrastination and felt like making a blog post about what I should be doing, and also to advertise the thesis. For those of you who are unfamiliar with Herodotus, he was a Greek historian, widely regarded as the “father of history” or of lies, depending on your source. He wrote a historical account of the Greco-Persian Wars and the events that led to them, which included a survey history of the formation of the Persian Empire under Cyrus, following through to Darius and Xerxes which I will assume everyone knows of from 300.

Essentially, the task is to examine Herodotus’ reason for writing and have concluded, and will hopefully prove, that Herodotus intended much more than to simply immortalize the events and actions of the Greeks and Persians, but to also present a lesson to his generation of Greeks, who, with the Persians rather weakened by the time of the Histories completion, were the dominant power in the known world.

I will post the essay in its entirety when I complete it, and since it’s due tomorrow… I’ll probably post it later tonight/early morning tomorrow. Now, off to hopefully complete it.

Pointless update… to get in the swing of things

Posted in Rambling... with tags , on October 7, 2009 by acannell

Been 10 months since my last post? How the hell did that happen. What so unbelievably life-altering completely destroyed my urge to blog… well, like most young idiots, the end of a relationship completely breaks down your ability to function. *stop* I can’t blame it on that… I stopped posting in December, didn’t break up until April… That is quite the gap.

Okay, let me retrace my steps here… Christmas? Second semester… ah yes, second semester – that was a shit-show. New roommate, the one detestable one that never cleaned? Yea, he dropped out and left his shit everywhere – FUN. I guess I was just ridiculously busy and then got stuck with a marketing job for the summer, combined with drinking my face off with my friends to “forget” about the ex, I guess I didn’t have much time for blogging.

Where to go from here then… I’m having a hard time recalling what the original purpose of me setting this whole thing up was. The Godspeed! quote seems to suggest I have some political or social views to share, but that doesn’t necessarily be the case. I think I’ll just take a very traditional road and post whatever seems to go through my head. So, right now: life update!

Since September I’ve been living in a new house with 3 of my best friends who finally moved to Waterloo, no more shitty ass roommates. Right? Well… maybe. I don’t really see eye-to-eye with my best friends when it comes to living together. We both have a very “alpha” personality. Now, I’m not saying we’re both macho, testosterone filled jocks, but we both feel the need to lead and sort of “run the show”. Well, he does, when it comes to communal living, I prefer to just be able to do my own thing – which isn’t working for him. Long story, I don’t want to get hung up on the roommate bullshit.

Somewhat looking for a job I suppose, half-assed… focusing on school, really wanted to get involved in the school stuff this year and then ended up slacking off somewhere along the line and not applying for half the things I wanted to. Just how it goes unfortunately, really wanted to get my own radio show on campus, but I think I missed the deadline for that… should check that out. It’s easy to get side-tracked I guess, and weeks seem to last all that much longer when you’re looking forward to the weekend and your first date in almost 6 months. Now let’s end with a dialogue between Ted Mosby and Barney Stinson.

“I don’t know Barney, Robin and I just broke up, I’m not ready.”

“When will you be ready?”

Well… I’m ready.

That was a teaser…

Posted in Rambling... with tags , , , on December 17, 2008 by acannell

So, go home for two days to see the girlfriend. Haven’t seen her in a month (not that long, I know – but I’m young, dumb and in love, haha) Anyway, back at the University town until Thursday. (side note to those who read my other stuff: the roommate has gone home for the holidays) Thus, I have the house all to myself until Thursday. Good in the fact that I don’t have to put up with him… bad in the fact that it’s up to me to clean up everything into a reasonable condition before I leave. Not going to scrub anything, but I should do the dishes – I don’t think dirty dishes work too well if they sit still for over a month.

It’s not all freedom here, been in my room pretty much all day. My landlord came into my house on Sunday or Monday and turned off my furnace (since I pay the utilities I don’t see how he has the fucking right to do that). Needless to say there was FROST IN MY HOUSE when I got in this morning. Had to wear a coat for a few hours while the house warmed up (slowly…) Additionally, have my final exam tomorrow (woot woot woot). Hopefully it will work out well, anxious to get my marks back. I’m probably right about average in my courses… Mostly Bs, one or two Cs and an A (the A is in my WW2 history; the exam i  have tomorrow). But… apparently the program average is C so… I’m doing alright. Used to being able to slack and get an A- average. Damn university… have to start trying.

Irrational behaviour

Posted in Rambling..., Rants with tags , , on December 13, 2008 by acannell

Someone explain it to me… what causes this? Irrational worries, jumping to conclusion that you have no reason to jump too. Should I be happy that I have such a vivid imagination? But, can I not control it so that it applies solely to my creative writing rather than messing with my head and making me think the worst has transpired… Lacking faith in people, assuming that the reason for one thing or another is because the absolutest worst possible scenario has transpired…

This needs to be fixed.